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30 October 1963

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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DAILY BRIEF

South Vietnam: (Extensive reshuffling of the South Vietnamese military command, and possibly of the civilian cabinet, is reported to be imminent.)

The changes reportedly will affect the top post of the armed forces and may involve appointment of one or more generals to the cabinet. Contemplated changes are also said to include a shift of corps commanders and possibly some province chiefs. A redesignation of military corps boundaries, to become effective on 1 November, could provide the occasion for some of the shifts.

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*Dahomey: The threat of serious civil disorder has lessened following the trade unionists' reluctant acceptance of ex-president Maga's participation in the four-man provisional government headed by Army Chief of Staff Soglo.

The labor leaders have suspended the general strike which forced Maga's resignation from the presidency. Despite their unhappiness at Maga's retaining a role in the government, they appear to be mollified by Soglo's assumption of the top position.

The new government will probably not deviate in any significant way from the predominantly pro-Western orientation of the Maga regime. Soglo, a veteran of many years service in the French Army, is reputed to be a conservative. Justin Ahomadegbe, whose tribal connection with Soglo suggests he may emerge as the most influential of the three civilian members of the government, in the past has supported Dahomey's ties with France.

The more militant labor leaders may yet demand Maga's complete ouster. If he is dropped, a strong reaction can probably be expected from northern tribesmen, who support the ex-president.

The upheaval in Dahomey will probably hasten the demise of the moderate, Paris-oriented Afro-Malagasy Union (UAM). It is likely to compound the confusion and hesitancy among UAM members which resulted from the revolution in Congo (Brazzaville) last August. It may also stimulate labor leaders in other UAM states to seek greater political influence.

There are at present no indications that any other African states plan to intervene militarily in Dahomey.

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Dominican Republic: Organized protests against the provisional government are increasing, but the attitude of the general public still has not crystallized)

On 27 October, Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party attracted several thousand persons to an antigovernment rally, its first since the coup. Agitation by leftist students, which resulted in one death and caused the closing of Santo Domingo's public schools on 29 October, has not abated. These developments lend credence to the US Embassy's feeling that "an undercurrent of uneasiness" is developing over the continuing political impasse.)

A break in the new regime's international isolation is imminent. The United Kingdom intends to recognize it today and other West European powers probably will follow suit shortly.

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Israel-Syria: The start of fall plowing by the Israelis in sensitive areas of the demilitarized zone has increased prospects of trouble with Syria. The UN Truce Supervision Organization has yet to get the two governments to agree on the precise location of a de facto line separating areas of previous Jewish and Arab cultivation.

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The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

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The Atomic Energy Commission

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